

8145. b. 118

AN

# ADDRESS

TO THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

OF

IRELAND:

BY

A FREEHOLDER.

---

*Vin ea nostra voco.*

HOR.

---

THE THIRD EDITION.

---

Printed in the Year, 1771.

Sir J. Caldwell

ADDRESS  
TO THE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS



FREE L.A.W.D.

A FREEHOLD

For six or more years.

The Third Edition.

Printed in the Year 1771.



consideration; because it is of great importance, that  
 objections to publick measures should be removed,  
 and that the Publick should be convinced in the  
 sense of Government, rather than conviction from  
 necessity.

## A N

In the second Place, I shall endeavour to shew the  
 necessity of a Bill, which I have the honour to  
 be able to present to you, and which I shall endeavour to  
 measure may be intended, if upon further consid-  
 ration it shall appear to have all consequences which  
 were not foreseen; and lastly, I shall endeavour to  
 demonstrate the utility of those measures, which will not be  
 supported, which will not be

## ADDRESS,

*Gentlemen,*

**H**AVING in common with every other indi-  
 vidual in this Kingdom, made a deposit in  
 your hands, of my Natural Rights for the  
 benefit of Civil Society; and submitted, not only  
 my Property, but, in some degree my Liberty, to  
 your disposal, I shall without ceremony or apology,  
 express my sentiments concerning several very im-  
 portant Objects of your Trust.

It must, I think, be universally allowed, that the  
 situation of *Ireland*, with respect to its state of de-  
 fence and interior strength, the application of pub-  
 lic money, and the natural disposition and interest  
 of the majority of its inhabitants, are topics of com-  
 parison of which all others are trifles. These involve  
 not only private Property, but publick Freedom, not  
 only the conveniences of Life, but our very Existence  
 as a Protestant People, under the unspeakable ad-  
 vantages of *British* Government.

In the first Place, I propose to shew the expediency  
 of the late Augmentation Bill, which though it is no  
 longer a measure in debate, is still a proper object of  
 A 2 consideration.

consideration; because it is of great importance, that objections to publick measures should be removed, and that the Publick should acquiesce in the Measures of Government, rather from conviction than necessity.

W. A.

In the second Place, I shall endeavour to shew the inefficacy of a Militia; because though a considerable sum has been granted for its establishment, the measure may be rescinded, if upon further consideration it shall appear to have ill consequences which were not foreseen; and lastly, I shall endeavour to demonstrate the utility of those measures, that our Chief Governor has supported, which will alone be sufficient to produce that confidence in his Administration, so necessary to the speedy and effectual carrying into execution every measure of publick advantage and utility.

As a necessary preparation for what I shall offer concerning the requests of defence, I shall endeavour to demonstrate our danger; and in the execution of this part of my undertaking, several very important objects will collaterally present themselves.

That the Invasion of *Ireland* would be the first thing the *French* would undertake if another war should break out, cannot be doubted; it is the opinion as well of those who are wholly retired from the political circle, and judge only by natural sagacity and the reason of things, as of those to whom publick affairs have been long a familiar object.

That the *French* thought the Invasion of *Ireland* a measure that would benefit themselves and distress *England*, appears to demonstration, by their having attempted it last war, and if the circumstances under which it was then attempted be considered, it will appear,

appear, to demonstration, that when another war shall happen, they will attempt it again.

WHEN they attempted it last, they had a war upon their hands in *Flanders*, *Germany* and *America*; they knew they should be obliged to divide their forces for the assistance of *Spain*; the war had already exhausted their country of men; and their marine was in a shattered condition.

If under these disadvantages the Invasion of *Ireland* was attempted, will it not be attempted when none of these disadvantages subsist? and if when attacked under these disadvantages it was saved by miracle, what will be its fate when the attack shall be supported in a manner which such disadvantages made impossible?

THERE is no doubt but that *France* is extremely discontented with the situation in which the last Treaty of Peace has left her, independent of that impatience of military disgrace, and passion for national glory, which so strongly characterize that people. Thus far the Peace may be inferred to be advantageous to *England*; but if it is advantageous with respect to what we have gotten, it cannot be justly estimated, until it be considered how far it enables us to keep these advantages; for great advantages extorted from an enemy, when reduced to a state of accidental and temporary weakness by a series of uncommon success, can never fail to ensure a speedy renewal of the war, if at the same time such an enemy is left in a state in which it can speedily recruit its powers.

Now it will appear that what has been ceded to us by the last Treaty, has not at all lessened the maritime power of *France*, upon which, with respect to us, their whole strength depends both as an enemy



in war, and a rival in trade, and though she has lost *North America*, she is still, with respect to her trade and settlements, in a state to preserve all her resources as a maritime power.

THE resources of a maritime power with respect to its trade and settlements are Money and a Marine; the resources of money are secured to *France*, by her valuable islands in the *West Indies*, which bring her more profit than all *America* ten times told; the resources of her marine are preserved by the liberty of fishing in the Gulf of *St. Laurence*, which is the greatest nursery for Seamen in the world; the advantages of those resources the *French* will now certainly improve in proportion as they have suffered by the neglect of them.

It is notwithstanding true, that it was the interest of *Great Britain*, rather to keep *North America* than *Martinico* and *Guadaloupe*; because though the *West India* Islands would have poured more money into the Kingdom; yet the trade to *America* employs more shipping; and if by a fleet of ten ships we should bring home all the treasure of *New Spain*, and by employing a thousand ships we should gain only a profit of ten per cent. upon a trade to *North America*, the *North America* trade would be better; for this only would enable us to keep what we gain, and when our gain keeps our National Credit firm, and the value of money nearly upon a par with the value of money in other nations, great increase of gain by few hands, is a manifest disadvantage; it increases the value of labour; it enables others to undersell us at foreign markets, it produces at once idleness and luxury; and in a word, it renders every nation, with respect to itself and others, what *Spain* is rendered by the mines of *Mexico* and *Peru*.

We

We seem to have erred therefore only in allowing the *French* a Fishery; and by enabling them thus to regain what we have compelled them to cede, we render the concession of no value: This capital error renders us liable to be hurt by other parts of the treaty, from which no disadvantage cou'd otherwise arise; for though by some vague and inaccurate stipulations, we had left them a pretence for new disputes, yet if by securing the essentials, we had deprived them of the power of making these disputes, the ground of a War, they wou'd have given us very little trouble; but, as things are, those parts of the treaty which give a pretence for a War become capital defects; and many such there are; particularly those relating to the *East Indies*; to the islands ceded in *North America*; to the fishery there, the limits of which are left in great uncertainty; to which may be added the smuggling which *France* certainly carries on in the *River St. Laurence* in consequence of the opportunities given by this treaty.

*France* therefore having the strongest inclination to renew a War arising from her highest interest, and being in a situation that will very soon put it in her Power, and at the same time furnish her with a pretence, there can be no doubt but that the Peace will be short.

It will not, perhaps, on this occasion, be altogether impertinent to consider on which side the advantage will lye, when a new War shall break out, and this will manifestly appear from the state of *England* and *France* with respect to other Nations, and the measures they pursue at home.

As to the state of the two Kingdoms with respect to other Powers, *France* has infinitely the advantage.

The

The Family Compact, which at the beginning of this Century was thought so formidable as to bring on a general War, in which the greatest Powers in Europe formed a confederacy against it, is now strengthened by the common Loss and Disgrace, which the two branches of the *House of Bourbon* has suffered by their first mutual effort; as they have suffered a common Disgrace, they have so far one common interest, and the resentment has also one common object; they will unite their efforts against *England* not from a mere sense of Obligation to fulfil engagements, nor yet altogether from views of political and national advantages, but from a common sense of injury and impatience of Revenge.

As to the measures pursued at home, the advantage on the part of *France* will appear to be yet greater. *France* is exerting her strength to recruit her Marine, which is of late very much increased: She has fitted out vessels for trade, particularly for the fishery, with the utmost diligence: She is exact in registering her seamen, and she has augmented her troops: We, on the contrary, are far from being as attentive as we ought to the encrease of our national strength, by which we might be able to repel the formidable force intended to act against us.

But there are yet other particulars in which we are growing weak, as our enemies are growing strong; the factions and contentions among the nobility who are struggling for places of profit and honour, though they have private causes, have public effects, that do not by any means terminate within the circle where they rise, but spread from the court to the nation, with the most extensive and destructive influence; for their whole views, and the whole power of their minds, being absorbed and engrossed by a personal



sonal contest, how is it possible they should attend to the general interest?

It is of absolute and immediate necessity that some means should be taken to lessen the public Debt; for without that, if the credit of the nation has any bounds, and if the ability of the people to pay taxes is not infinite, our resources in another war must fail at the very root: Some measure therefore should be taken to make the money brought into the Exchequer adequate to the taxes laid on the people; to prevent smuggling; to lessen the expence of collecting the revenue; to regulate the officers employed for that purpose; to repress private luxury, as far as can be done without injury to trade and commerce; to prevent commercial monopolies; and to encourage population.

An immediate attention to these particulars is the more necessary, as it must appear from what has been said, as well as from many other obvious reasons, that *France* will soon resolve upon another war, and when that shall happen there is the greatest reason to suppose that the invasion of *Ireland* will be attempted by surprize, even before a formal declaration of hostilities, which they would believe or at least represent, as a just retaliation for our taking their ships before war was declared, upon the last rupture between the two nations.

But taking for granted that *Ireland* will be invaded, which seems irrefragably to follow from what has been already offered, it is still worth while to consider what in particular the encouragements are upon which a resolution to adopt such an enterprize is founded; for the removing or contracting these encouragements is one measure to prevent its success.

IN the first place the *French* are all apprized that the lower class of the Roman Catholicks in *Ireland*, which out-number the Protestants at least three to one, would join and support them with the utmost alacrity and joy, at the same time that they must with the greatest reason be convinced, that the most sensible of the Titular Bishops and Priests, as well as the Roman Catholicks of landed interest and in trade, would be most averse to any attempt made by the *French* to distress this their native Country. It is not at all to be doubted but that every reasonable Roman Catholick of property, has a lively sense of his true interest in opposition to the partial and desperate views of bigotry and superstition; and it is indeed the interest, and ought to be the endeavour, of every man of influence and power in *Ireland*, to obtain the affection and confidence of the Roman Catholicks of that class; the restraints which state policy make necessary, should be rendered as light as possible, and as these very restraints furnish opportunities of kindness, which would otherwise have no object, the very circumstances which make their good-will desirable, makes it easy to be obtained: Their attachment to his Majesty and Government has been very apparent on many interesting occasions, and in particular when the *French* intended to invade *Ireland* in the last War, and their loyalty is certainly a test of their understanding; they well know that even a successful invasion of *Ireland*, would never terminate in a permanent and quiet possession of it by the *French*, as an appendage to their Kingdom: they consider that the general System of *Europe*, the situation of the *British Dominions*, our Naval Force and interior resources, make this absolutely impossible; with what view then could any sensible Roman Catholick of property in *Ireland* favour such an invasion? the only consequence that could follow, supposing it to be successful,

successful, would be a contest, in which all that is dear to man, whether in a publick or private capacity, must be swallowed up at once in one vast and tremendous ruin.

Does a man's being a Roman Catholick render it eligible for him to concur in an attempt to make his native Country, the scene of all his connexions, and the repository of all his property, a seat of War? Wou'd he not share in the distress which the invasion was intended to bring upon great Britain? in the rage of civil War wou'd the sword spare his family or the flames his dwelling? could he say to murder and rapine "hitherto shall ye come and no further"; and when the storm shall be past, can it be supposed to leave him in the same state that he possessed before.

As the Roman Catholicks are in number a much more considerable part of the Nation than the Protestants, their share in any publick calamity must be greater in proportion, and when the time comes that shall put the Protestant into peaceable possession of all that the ravages of War have left him, the sufferings of the Catholicks who should have concurred to bring on the mischief, wou'd continue with new force: fines, forfeitures, imprisonment, and death, will revenge the injury they have done to their country, and more severe and mortifying restrictions wou'd be thought necessary to prevent the repeating the same outrage for the time to come.

What cause, or what connexion cou'd require such a sacrifice? Is it the cause of God, or the connexion with France? it can never be the cause of God that makes desolate the Earth, and what merit has France to plead for the preservation of her supposed friendship at such expence? has she not treated the *Isle* already in her service with the most shameful ingratitude?



gratitude? Has she not deceived them in every expectation? In her late Disputes with the Courts of Justice, has she not proceeded to the excess, even of Moorish despotism? With respect to that very Religion which is supposed to give her preference in the estimation of the Roman Catholics, is she not a schismatick, and has she not thrown off her allegiance to the Papal authority?

THE sensible Roman Catholics of *Ireland* must know, that as an invasion abetted by them would involve them in inevitable ruin, however it might terminate; an invasion repelled, would not only secure them the tranquil possession of the advantages which they already enjoy, but encrease them. It would be a demonstration that a system of Penal Laws, and disadvantageous restrictions, are not necessary, and changes must take place in them, not for their sake only, but for the sake of the community in general, of which they are a part; for it is most certain that whatever restrains a spirit of industry and enterprize, with respect to any part of the nation, tends in the same proportion, to impoverish and enfeeble the whole.

THERE is therefore not the least reason to distrust the conduct of any of the Roman Catholics of property in *Ireland*, upon any emergency; nor is there any doubt but they will join the efforts of their fellow Citizens and Countrymen, with their utmost power, against the tyrannical views of an implacable enemy, whenever an occasion shall offer. But with respect to the lower class of the Roman Catholics, as I observed before, there is no doubt but they will warmly espouse the interest of the *French*: In all communities there are some bad Men to be found, and there is no doubt but there are Priests in the *French* interest,

interest, who make it their business to persuade the deluded poor, that they never can enjoy the free exercise of their Religion, while they are ruled by a Protestant Government: They are made to consider their restraint in Religion, and their exclusion from national advantages, to be not only their own cause, but the cause of God, they therefore naturally infer, and indeed are expressly taught, that it is their duty as well as interest, to subvert the Government by which this restraint and exclusion must in the nature of things be continued; this added to the hopes of a relief from poverty, makes them wish for such an opportunity as an invasion would give; there are many of these poor people, who, on account of their bad circumstances at home, are under the necessity of insisting in the *French* service; this produces a connexion, dependance and intelligence between the two countries; a channel through which the *French* can at any time obtain a minute and circumstantial account of every thing relative to *Ireland*, especially of every thing that may encourage an attempt upon it. That such intercourse is reciprocal, there is strong evidence; for it is confidently said that Lord *Chatham* had his intelligence of the last attempt to invade *Ireland*, long before it was made, from Priests, who, from a principle of Religion and Virtue, wish'd that their native country should be on its guard against such a dreadful calamity. The *French* have experienced the facility with which they can avail themselves of the particular state of *Ireland*, with respect to the great number of the lower class of Popish inhabitants, thus secretly, but strongly attached to their interest; for it appears from the best authority that they had sown the seeds of insurrection preparatory to the last attempt, which even when the war was over, broke out in various outrages committed by the Whiteboys, a desperate Rabble, which had every mark of being

being originally under *French* or *Spanish* influence; they wore their shirts over their coats to resemble the *French* uniform, and they ty'd on their hats with white lined hat-bands like *Spanish* Mirlots; the poorest of the insurgents had plenty of money, and great quantities of the *French* coin were known to circulate in the country.

The *French* know how easy this influence may be renewed, especially as the disturbances are not wholly quiet even to this hour; it may be proper to remark, that there is an infinite difference between popular discontent in *Ireland*, and *England*; the utmost to be dreaded from a mob in *England* is a few days idleness, and drowsiness, and a few broken windows in a house or two that are inhabited by unpopular persons; but in *Ireland* a Popish mob is the most dreadful instrument that could possibly fall into the hands either of a foreign or domestic enemy, and will always endanger for a time, the subversion of the state. About the motives and views of a mob, it is scarcely worth while to reason; they act generally from a sudden impulse and romantic expectations of they know not what; but the poor, who are the many, in all countries, have little to lose, and therefore little to fear; nor one in a thousand can be brought to a personal punishment, and a pecuniary punishment is impossible to all; their chance therefore, in every popular commotion, is all for gain. It appears possible to get something, and impossible that any thing can be lost; the only remark that remains on this head is, that as a great number of Papists in *Ireland* during the last war, were trained to arms, the mob will consist of great numbers that want nothing but arms, to take the field as a regular force.



ANOTHER encouragement to the *French* to invade *Ireland* is a perfect knowledge of the Soundings on every part of the coasts, and the best methods of eluding our men of war, and of landing men where it will be least likely to spread an alarm, which they can at all times obtain from our Smugglers of Wool, who keep a constant intercourse with the *French*, by means of that illicit Trade; from these men they may also obtain an exact knowledge of every pass by which the interior part of the country may be entered from the coast, and there can be no doubt but that they will avail themselves of these advantages whenever it becomes requisite; for nothing can be more easy for a great nation, than to engage the out-casts of another in its interest.

As the *French* have always smissaries in this country, there is no doubt but they are well acquainted with the following particulars, and that they will apply their knowledge of them to a better use than we.

WE have as yet no military map of the country.

THERE is not a single fortification in the kingdom.

THERE are no troops even equal to one considerable garrison.

If there were troops there is no person that has a sufficient knowledge of the country to command them.

THERE is not Artillery equal to a fifty gun ship.

AND

And scarce a single Engineer.

Nor have we the least knowledge of the soundings upon the coasts or the passes or strong holds of the country.

In a word the country is quite destitute of defence. It may be said perhaps that if twenty thousand men from *France* were to take possession of *Ireland*, not one would return alive, as we have a sufficient force at sea to block up all the ports; but admitting this to be true, it will neither divert the *French* from the attempt, nor much, if at all, lessen the mischief we shall suffer from it.

It is well known that military operations are deliberately undertaken, the event of which is more uncertain, and loss of men nearly equal, at the same time that the end proposed is less important. War at present is a science, reduced to principles so certain, that a calculation can be made, not only of how much money, but how many men any fortress will cost; the sieges in *Flanders* that have but opened the way to contest, have cost, and it was known that they would cost, many more than twenty thousand men: The loss of three men can better be sustained by the *French*, than the loss of one man by us, and for these reasons it cannot be concluded that the *French* would make any scruple of sacrificing twenty thousand men to an object so important as the conquest of *Ireland*.

LET us then think a moment, if we can bear to think, what would be the consequence to us of the conquest of *Ireland* by *France*, supposing that we should

should at length recover possession of it, against a large military force thrown on us by her, nor the number that, by abetting her, will become equally enemies to the state. From the moment the enemy is in possession of the country the people must be considered as an hostage in their hands; if we block up the ports, and reduce the conquerors to extremity, what reprisals may they not make? The total stagnation of trade, the subversion of public credit, the confusion of private property, are trifles in comparison of other mischiefs, that an enemy in the heart of the country might perpetrate, either to extort terms, or in the fury of desperation if terms are denied them, violence, rape, murder, conflagration, all the horrors of war rush upon the imagination at once, so as at first to aggrize, and at last to stupify.

Let it be supposed, contrary to what I believe, and to the belief of every reasonable man whose opinion I have heard, that those evils are in a great degree imaginary, and that it is fifty to one that they will not happen; yet surely if they are within the verge of possibility it behoves us to guard against them, as far as it can be done without incurring other evils, which though not so great in themselves, yet, being certain and immediate, may counterbalance others that are uncertain and remote. As every preparation for defence will make an attempt against *Ireland* less likely to succeed, it will also, for that very reason, render the attempt less likely to be made, and if the money that has hitherto been dissipated in jobs, for the smaller advantage of individuals, under the pretence of *Inland Navigation*, *Piers*, *Bridges*, and innumerable other chimeras, had been laid out in putting *Ireland* in a state of defence, upon a plan which ought to have

B

been



been formed for that purpose, it would at once tend to secure it against the invasion of an enemy, to support the dignity of the Crown, secure the Protestant Religion, improve the interior police, give stability to public credit, and permanence to private property.

It may well be thought very strange that the defenceless state of *Ireland* being notorious, and the danger of a sudden invasion universally acknowledged, that there should have been persons of influence, who so far from concurring, even opposed, on trifling pretences, the most salutary measure of an augmentation, which would certainly in some measure tend to remedy these evils, and that there are many who still take much pains to render that measure unpopular: It is indeed very surprising that gentlemen who had both a publick and private interest at stake, should be so infatuated.

It is to be hoped that these gentlemen will be now fully convinced from the present situation of affairs, that every proper measure should be taken to secure *Ireland* from the manifest danger to which she is exposed, both within and without, from domestic commotions and foreign attacks, and that hereafter they will contribute to prevent her from being any longer in a state that does not less disgrace Government than endanger the Inhabitants: It is to be hoped that they will be contented that public money shall be applied to public purposes, and that a desire for interior improvements, which may produce advantages to particular Counties, or increase the riches of the country, will not interfere with carrying into execution plans for the defence of the country which is so immediately and so absolutely necessary: The true interest of every part is certainly involved in that of the

the whole, and it is equally absurd and injurious, to wish to apply that money in local improvements, for the increase of wealth, which is necessary to secure the existence of the whole state: Whatever improves or enriches *Ireland* without defending it affords an additional temptation to an enemy, at the same time that it contributes to insure his success: It must therefore be the opinion of every reasonable man, that the money which has been usually applied to partial, though public purposes, should henceforth be applied to put the country, as a whole, in a state of defence, in the first place, after which it may return into its usual channel. It would be very proper to pursue these measures when we shall be able to keep it; but before, it must increase our danger and precipitate our ruin.

It is very happy that the first requisite towards the defence of this country, has been adopted by placing the Military Establishment upon such a footing, as to be an addition to the King's forces adequate to the expence: Nothing was more generally complained of, or with greater reason, than the inefficacy and impropriety of the Peace Establishment here: Though the number of men continued were as usual but twelve thousand, yet the regiments were increased from thirty to forty-two: the additional expence was very considerable, and the regiments here consisting of fewer men than those on the *English* establishment, the rotation duty for foreign service, of which, it is but just, that every part of the army should take its share, was attended with insuperable inconveniencies; the regiments left at home must be drafted to complete those going abroad to the *English* establishment, and it was a considerable time before recruits could be raised in *England*, and brought over to complete them; this added to the small establishment of effective men, left the country

without troops, and the commanders of regiments without motives to fulfil their duty; officers could scarce be desired to attend quarters, when it often happened that a Captain, Lieutenant and Ensign had not all together a Serjeant's command.

THE error of this establishment has now been remedied by the only method possible, which is by an increase of private men to each regiment; by this means, comparatively speaking, at a small expence, we shall always have twelve thousand effective men in this kingdom, and we have also the most solemn engagements from the Crown that this number shall always be continued; this will in some measure answer the important purpose of defence, at a very small charge, and even with some incidental advantages; the recruiting money that went to *England* to enlist men for replacing the draughts that were sent abroad, and which was very considerable will be saved, the pay of the twelve thousand men will circulate in the country, an advantage more than equivalent to many schemes of imaginary improvement, upon which greater sums than the augmentation will require have been expended; the regiments will be compleated from *England*, which will increase our inhabitants, and an increase of inhabitants is known to be an increase of wealth; these inhabitants will be Protestants, and they will therefore add strength to the Protestant interest.

It is certain that some persons in power opposed this measure, and still continue to censure its being adopted, from apprehensions of becoming unpopular, but surely he that opposes, or even discourages a measure that he believes to be of public and important utility, to gain the momentary and tumultuous approbation of ignorance and prejudice, deserves the disgrace



disgrace and infamy which he must incur, even from those very people, when calamity, or the near prospect of calamity shall have opened their eyes, to the wisdom of the measure, and the treachery of their pretended Friends. Steadily to persevere in doing that which is right, is the surest means to gain the confidence of mankind, and to lay the foundation of a popularity, which, though perhaps not immediate, will be certain, uniform, and permanent.

THERE is another argument made use of to decry this measure, and to render it unpopular, which is, that it is the intention of Government to employ those troops for other purposes than a defence of *Ireland*, one would imagine that the power which the Parliament has reserved to itself of discontinuing those augmented troops, whenever they should be employed contrary to engagement, might be sufficient to silence such weak reasoners. But independent of this Parliamentary Power, let us now consider what motives could induce Government to deceive us, by violating an engagement confirmed by Royal and Ministerial Assurances.

THE defence of *Ireland* is with great reason, become an object of the highest importance and attention to *Great-Britain*. *Ireland* is a privy purse to the Crown, whose grandeur and consequence would be lessened by the want of such a support. There is a very extensive and lucrative trade carried on between the two nations, the balance of which is very considerably in favour of *Great-Britain*, who, for some Years past has been constantly supplied, even with the necessaries of life, from *Ireland*; provisions, linen-cloth, tallow, hides, and many other articles of general consumption, are daily exported from *Ireland* to *England*.

TAE

THE Sugar Islands which constitute a considerable part of the wealth of *Britain*, are principally supplied from *Ireland*; Beef, except *English* and *Irish* is improper for salting, and therefore no other is exported; whatever money is brought into the country in lieu of these essentials, is returned back again to *England* by remittances to Absentees, who spend the income of their great estates, and lucrative employments there.

THE Marine, which is the essential and natural strength of *Great-Britain*, could not be supported in a vigorous state without the important resources, which it finds in *Ireland*, and every Commander of the Army, during the last war, can testify the essential aid that his Majesty's forces received from this loyal, brave, and martial country.

BESIDES the aid that *Ireland* has been, and may be, to the *British* Dominions, with respect to Money, Marine, and Men, superior to any other part of its Empire, it has the advantage of proximity, which renders those aids speedy and efficacious, and at the same time keeps up such a connexion between the countries, as must essentially and reciprocally interest each in the welfare of both, and it is, and for all these reasons ought to be, at least the second great object of the attention of Government, allowing *England* to be the first. Can any person therefore, pretend, that contrary to the most solemn assurances of the Crown, confirmed in the strongest constitutional manner, troops are to be raised and paid by *Ireland*, that they may be sent to *America*, to force our fellow subjects into slavery, or cut their throats, and that for this laudable purpose *Ireland* is to be abandoned to the fury of an implacable enemy and the Crown of *Great-Britain* shaken.

SELF-

**SELF-INTEREST**, independent of every engagement, must operate strongly upon all who are in their senses, and are not predestined by some unaccountable fatality to utter destruction.

AMONG other reasons against an Augmentation, it was said to be intended to dragoon this country into a Land-tax or a Union, and by that means entirely subvert the Constitution. As to a Land-tax, it is well known, that half the sum that has been laid out for many years past on jobs, was more than sufficient for the Augmentation, and why that constitutional method of laying out the Public Money, for the defence and the service of the Public, should make a Land-tax necessary, which is not made necessary by laying out twice that sum for the emolument and gratification of private persons, those who opposed the measure, and those who still continue to condemn it, may tell us if they can.

THE Public indeed have now such evidence, that neither a Land-tax nor a Union was intended by the Augmentation, as they could not have had if the Bill had not passed: they may probably suspect, that those who suggested such views, intended only to make others the dupes of a fallacy, which they despised themselves, but as the same farce may be played, whenever another measure, by which private interest will be sacrificed to public utility, is to be opposed, I shall not think an opportunity of exposing its absurdity lost, any more than if I had written when the Augmentation Bill, against which it was last exhibited, was in suspense. Of the Land-tax I have taken some notice already, but surely of all the Bugbears that were ever devised to raise popular clamour against Court Measures, that of a Union is the grossest affront to Common



Common Sense. A Union would not only be diametrically opposite to the interest of persons of independent property, and to the trading Cities of *Britain* but to the Crown, and therefore can never take place; *Ireland*, as has already been observed, is a Privy Purse to the Crown, and by that means an essential and necessary support to the Prerogative. The moment that *Ireland* should become a part of *Great-Britain*, the Revenues of the Country would go into the Aggregate Fund, nor could the King, consistent with the Constitution, have any dominion over them; at present the King's power over the Public Money in the Treasury of *Ireland*, in the common course of Administration is not controuled: And it can be controuled only by the Parliament's not granting a Supply, a measure that is never taken, but when there is danger of the Prerogative's being extended too far. It may therefore be taken for granted, that none of the Servants of the Crown, will ever propose or consent to a Union, as it can never be their interest to lessen the power which the King now possesses over the Treasury of *Ireland*.

INDEPENDENT men of fortune, who are ever jealous of the prerogative, would certainly not wish for such an increase to the Peers and Commons of *England*, as a Union would cause; they well know the dead weight of the *Scotch* Members upon all Court questions, and they would with reason fear that the dependance of the Representatives of *Ireland* would have the same effect.

BUT above all a Union would most essentially prejudice the trading part of *Great Britain*; the situation of *Ireland*, and its good Ports and Harbours, make it a Country much better adapted to a general Trade than *England*, and the *English* have been so jealous of the rivalship of this Country, that they have

have laid its Trade under certain restrictions by *English* Laws; the very basis of a Union must be the taking off those restrictions, and opening the Ports of *Ireland* to a free Trade, which would on all accounts most essentially prejudice the trading towns of *Great Britain*; but could it be supposed that any set of men in *England* had such a measure in contemplation, they must begin by determining first to subvert totally the constitution of *Ireland*; all ranks of people, and in particular the Parliament, are so very jealous of their own importance, of the liberty of disposing of their money, and of an independent and separate constitution, that they would rise in one body, with the greatest vigour, to oppose any measure that would for ever deprive them of these advantages, which they consider as the supreme blessings of life; and the *English* are too wise not to know, that whatever advantages might result from a Union they would think it too dearly bought; the violence that must be used to effect it, the establishment of oppressive measures by military force, and the inflaming a sister Country, would be precedents that might well make them tremble for themselves.

Those who by various arts, and from various motives, opposed the Augmentation, and still continue to decry the measure, all agreed that something should be done for the defence of the Kingdom, and to give a colour of sincerity to their intentions, which might reasonably be suspected, they became warm advocates for a Militia Bill, in some respects resembling that which has taken place in *Great Britain*, though they well knew that a Militia armed and at stated times imbodyed, would be of most fatal consequence to this Country: thus they have perpetrated one injury to their Country to conceal another, as Negroes when they steal rum fill up the cask with water that it may not be miss, and so spoil what remains.

EVEN

EVEN in *England*, the Country in the World best calculated for a Militia, that scheme which was for sometime extremely popular is fallen into disrepute; the inconveniencies that arise from it are many and great, though they cannot pertinently be mentioned here, as no parallel can be drawn, even in the outlines of the scheme, between the two Countries.

IN the south of *Ireland* a Militia will still be found impracticable, and it will be attended with great danger, and certain loss in the North. A Militia in this Country can consist only of Protestants, and in the South, there are from fifteen to twenty Roman Catholics for one Protestant; the Protestant Families are also dispersed at great distances from each other, so that collecting a Militia from among them will be very difficult and at the same time very oppressive. Every Protestant Family will be obliged constantly to furnish a man to make out the requisite number, so that the quota cannot be regulated, as in all other Countries, either by ballot or rotation: what then must the Protestant suffer on account of that very Religion, which ought to be encouraged and supported with the greater attention, as its professor is surrounded by those who hold him, on that very account, at enmity.

THE subjecting by compulsion one man out of every Protestant Family in a whole Country to military discipline and service, to the loss of his time, and the dissipation of his mind, from his trade and labour, will be such an oppression in general, and in some cases such total ruin to a family, as will greatly discourage conversion, and counteract many of the penal laws, it will prevent in a great measure the good effects of Charter-schools, and deter Protestants from coming to settle in a Roman Catholic Country, whose strength  
to



to the state, arising from their numbers, and example from the advantages of their Religion, as an incitement to conversion, is more peculiarly wanted.

SCARCE any addition to the strength and defence of the Kingdom could compensate for such disadvantages. But the measure in question, instead of adding to our strength and defence, will be found to increafe our weakness and danger.

NOTHING could more encourage or rejoice the lower class of the Roman Catholicks, the White-Boys, and the outcasts of every denomination, than to see the Protestant house-keeper oppressively obliged to bear arms; they will exult in his distress, and what is of infinite more consequence, they will always be able to take his arms from him, and turn them against the state, perhaps one time as an enemy at war, and at another, as White-Boys or Levellers; how can a poor labourer or mechanic, who is compelled to military discipline, and trained for a month in the year, which time should have been employed in providing the necessaries of life for his family, defend those arms he so reluctantly bears against fifteen or twenty desperate men? If he has the strongest inclination to defend himself against such numbers, he will not have the power; but it is very probable that the inclination will be wanting, his heart if not his lips would say, take these arms, they cannot do me more harm in your hands than in my own. This argument will have as great force with respect to numbers, as to individuals. By what magic can an hundred poor, discontented, undisciplined, Militia men forced into service against their inclination, prevent their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition from falling into the hands of two thousand disaffected, desperate persons, abetted by *France* and *Spain*, and animated by the spirit of White Boys or Levellers?

The

The disaffected will probably make desperate attempts to force these arms even from a repository where they shall be kept.

The establishment of a Militia in the North of *Ireland* is next to be considered; almost all the inhabitants of the North of *Ireland* are Protestants indeed, but they are Dissenters; a general discontent at being obliged to pay the legal dues of the Clergy, and the county Cesses, raised such a spirit of contumacy and rebellion among them, as broke out, a short time ago, into the most unheard of outrages, attended with torturing and murder. These insurgents associated under the denomination of Oak-boys; assembled in vast numbers, and over-ran the whole Country, compelling people of all ranks and denominations, even some of the first gentlemen of the Counties where they passed, to take a solemn oath publicly in the County Towns, not to submit to the law in the payment of certain impositions, they even opposed a military force, and it was with great difficulty and after doing much mischief, that they were at length repelled; they were encouraged, abetted and set on by persons of independent property, and this spirit was so general and prevalent even among that class, that no jury after the affair was over would find any of these criminals guilty, upon the strongest proof of their having committed the greatest outrage, and in some cases murder aggravated with uncommon cruelty. This Oak-boy spirit is by no means at this time quenched, opportunity with a very little encouragement would again blow it into flames.

A subjection to the Civil Power, in the Lower Class is not properly established in the North of *Ireland*. It is well known that in many places it is difficult to find Petty Officers who dare execute a Justice of Peace's Warrant. The Northern Inhabitants

bitants should certainly be made amenable to the Laws of the Country, before they are intrusted with arms, or trained to the use of them; can it be thought, prudent to make them powerful while they are refractory and seditious? Had a part of them been armed and disciplined in the last Insurrection, thousands that kept themselves quiet because they had no prospect of success, nay ten thousands would have been tempted to join them; for indeed the whole Country seemed willing, and were prevented from it only by their dread of a military force, which if they had been armed, they would have set at defiance. When a Militia is established, many of those who led the Insurgents will be Officers, and by this means their influence and power will be greatly increased. The last Insurrection without these aids struck the whole country with a panic; if the insurgents had been armed, the consequence would have been dreadful beyond all description. Whatever encourages the like Rebellion, will involve this Country in the horrors of Civil War, and even that calamity, dreadful as it is, will be much enhanced by this interruption, and perhaps total overthrow of our Linen Manufactory, which may be considered as the very vitals of this Country. The Linen Manufactory, must indeed suffer from the mere introduction of a military spirit, the inevitable consequences of which are idleness and dissipation, and drunkenness, a contempt of labour, and a desire to live without it. We shall not only suffer in our Linen Manufacture by the dissipation and idleness of Militia-men, but also by that of many others, who, by this establishment will be tempted into the same course: It is well known that in countries where ignorance and superstition have substituted forms and ceremonies for the essentials of Religion, it has been found necessary to lessen the number of Holy Days, yet by this measure we shall increase them,



them, for every day will be a Holy Day, on which the Militia will be drawn out, either for exercise or review.

THOSE whose duty it has been to attend the exercising of troops in different countries, all know by experience, that even where troops are usually quartered, if the place be populous, the number of Spectators is greater than that of the men; I have myself often rebuked these idlers, but never with success. There is something irresistibly captivating in the parade of Military Exercise; "In the shrill Trump, the spirit-stirring Drum, the ear-piercing Fife, the Royal Banner, Pride, Pomp, and Circumstance of War," which mistaken mortals have made the source of glory, and when Militia are to be exercised where troops have been seldom seen, Novelty is added to every other incitement, it will be impossible for the Husbandman or Artificer to restrain his servants, and the very attempt will produce a mutual ill-will, which may be considered as another mischief naturally and necessarily resulting from the measure, especially as every Manufacturer and Rustick who is metamorphosed into a Soldier, will have companions and relations, who will plead a kind of right to see him under Arms in his Red-coat; some perhaps to laugh, and others to admire.

The very existence of this Country depends upon the Linen Manufactory, and any thing that impairs or interrupts a regular progress in that source of our National Wealth, essentially prejudices the interest of the whole Kingdom, much more than six times the sum that was necessary, to add three thousand men to the Military Establishment: The interruption of the Linen Manufactory which a Militia will certainly cause, will probably be a means of producing a scarcity, and of consequence enhance

hance the price of our Linen at a foreign market; dearness and scarcity will naturally let the branch of trade, in some degree, slip out of our hands, and by that means encourage our rivals to vie with us, and tempt our customers to other markets. But setting all these inconveniencies aside, let us now consider the neat expence of cloathing, arming and exercising for one month in the year, a body of ten thousand Militia, and a less number would be quite ineffectual. The cloathing and arming them will be more than three times as much as the cloathing and arming of the late Augmentation: It will be necessary that the Non-commissioned Officers and Drums of this Militia should be always kept in pay, these ten thousand men cannot be embodied for a less time than one month in the year, they must be allowed during that time, at least six pence a day, and they could earn at least eighteen pence, so that here is a dead loss to the Community of thirty thousand Pounds, besides all other contingent expences: and I will take upon me to say, that the negative expence is infinitely a greater loss to the Public, than if it was positive, because it includes that interruption of our Linen Manufactory, and that dissipation in the Manufacturer, the bad consequences of which I have already mentioned; and at the same time introduces a military spirit, very inconsistent with labour and industry: a spirit which it would be much more salutary to repress than encourage, considering the present disposition of the inhabitants of the North, and the very imperfect police of that Country.

BUT as independent of all these objections, which in my judgment are insurmountable, the neat expence of establishing ten thousand Militia will be greater than the adding three thousand Men by the Augmentation: So the service of the Militia, when established, will be less effectual for the defence of  
this

this Country. I have myself served both with and against irregular troops, and I never yet knew or heard in any Country, that a Militia, obliged to serve by law, embodied but at certain times, and marched out of their own Country, from their possessions and families, were of very much use; and if that be the case, it is of great importance that we should be defended rather by the smaller number, than by the greater, if the defence is equal.

The supporting of a large body of men in this Kingdom, in the summer months, without plunder or killing young cattle, would be a difficult task. But there is yet another reason why we should not incur the train of evils already mentioned by establishing and embodying a Militia in the *North of Ireland*; all the defence which the inhabitants can afford, will be afforded without it.

They are as I said before not only Protestants, but Dissenters, and have the strongest prejudice against all Roman Catholics; but especially the *French*; nor is this prejudice likely to evaporate in vain speculations or idle wishes. In this Country there is neither affluence nor sloth, to enervate the body, or intimate the mind; these people are a hardy yeomanry, inured to labour, familiar with hardships, and animated by danger; and if attacked in their own Country, would defend their property and their principles, with a native vigour and inflexibility, that have in all ages been found invincible, except by long time; and the successive hostilities of superior force; this spirit sufficiently appeared at the landing of *Tibbot*, and at the late insurrection when they thought themselves aggrieved; and though they would not without great reluctance, leave their dwellings and their families, to defend the inhabitants of the southern parts of the Country, whom they regard, and for  
their



their sakes the places where they live, with all the prejudice of religious enmity, we may safely avail ourselves of their numbers, courage and loyalty, for the defence of their own Country, without being at the expence or suffering the many other inconveniences of establishing a compelled mercenary Militia among them: the little discipline that such a Militia would learn by a month's practice in the year, would be but of small use in the Day of action, and it is very probable the rest of the inhabitants would have a greater dependance upon them than they ought, and would consider a Militia clothed, armed and trained, whole duty it was to defend them, adequate to the task, and for these reasons would be more supine and negligent in making efforts for their own preservation and that of their Country, whereas if no Militia was established among them, every man would think it fell to his share and was his immediate interest as well as duty to take the field. They would make every thrust to furnish themselves with offensive weapons, and if arms were put into their hands they would chuse leaders, and rise in one body, animated with one soul to risk their lives to chastise the insolence of an implacable *French* Catholic enemy, who dare to invade their Country.

It has now been shewn that in the *South of Ireland* a Militia is impracticable, without the most cruel oppression of those whom it is most our interest and duty to protect and cherish; without enabling those to become strong, whom it is equally our interest and duty to keep weak; without counteracting laws, the perpetual operation of which is absolutely necessary to national security, even in time of peace, without precluding the benefits of a public institution for propagating loyalty and the Protestant Religion, which in this Country, must, in the lower classes,

always go together ; if it has been shewn that in the *Norib* the Protestants themselves are factious and refractory ; that they are already formidable to the civil Power ; that by arming them, before-hand, against an enemy, they will be incited and enabled to spread round them the horrors of civil War ; that when an invasion should happen they will not as a Militia march to the defence of other Provinces, and that if they should not be formed into a Militia they would act vigorously, and probably effectually in the defence of their own ; and if it has been proved that upon the whole a Militia will be expensive, and ineffectual, setting aside the positive danger and inconvenience which it must of necessity produce ; and if it has been proved, that it will be highly detrimental to the Linen Manufactory, upon which the wealth and population of this Country so essentially depends, it is to be hoped that from henceforth no man will presume so much upon the ignorance and folly of those whom he wishes to deceive, as to pretend that his zeal for a Militia is a test of his public spirit or his humanity, his love to his Country, or to mankind.

THE Military Establishment being increased, the next thing to be effected for the defence of *Ireland* is a topographical knowledge of the Country, to render this knowledge most effectual for our defence, it is necessary to mention that some time after the defeat of *Monsieur de Conflans*, a certain intelligence was communicated to a person in great Power, that when the *French* made again an attempt to invade *Ireland*, they would vary their plan of operation ; and this may be well conjectured from the following reasons.

THEY

THEY have but very few Ports opposite to the South of Ireland, where a great Armament of Ships of War and Transports could be assembled; all preparation in such Ports, would necessarily be known in England, and the Fleets assembled there blocked up in them, and if they shou'd slip out by surprize or accident, it is probable in the highest degree that they would not reach the place of destination; for less than an equal number of Ships of the Line are an overmatch for a convoy of Transports; but if these shou'd even make good their landing, their Men of War and Transports are sure to be blocked up or intercepted in their return, for there are many particulars with respect to Ports, Shores, and weather, that enable a few ships to annoy a great number, when they are situated between them and the Land; to all which it must be added, that our Marine is such as will enable us, if any sudden and temporary advantage shou'd be gained against us, to reinforce our Fleets, and that our very situation will preserve our communication, at the same time that it cuts off that of our enemies.

THESE particulars make it highly probable, that the intelligence communicated to the great man above mentioned, might be depended upon, and that the plan of operation hereafter mentioned, which was at the same time communicated to his lordship, was the very plan, which the *French* meant to carry into execution, if the situation of their affairs had permitted them during the remainder of the War to attempt again the invasion of this Country, it is certain that the plan which they had formed, had the appearance of greater facility, less risk, and a better prospect than their last.



THEIR intention was certainly to distress *England* by a powerful diversion, a temporary conquest of *Ireland*, and to gain pecuniary advantages more than equivalent to their Expence by the plunder of the country. To this purpose, as has been observed, they might probably think it well worth their while to sacrifice ten thousand men, and if they could land that number, with ten thousand stands of arms, they could certainly effect their design, supposing *Ireland* to be in the same state as at present. It is generally allowed that ten thousand men at least would join them, and in that case *Ireland* would be made to act against itself for their advantage by a civil war. The country could not hope to oppose such a number with equal force, on so sudden an emergency, and they would therefore very soon make their way through it.

LET us now first consider their plan for the invasion of *Ireland*, as it has transpired, and if they continue in the same intention hereafter, then what alterations should be made in the state of the country to prevent its success.

THOUGH the great ports of *France*, whence a considerable naval armament could be dispatched, are few, and all liable to blockade, yet she has small ports in great number all along the coast, and she intended to fit out from as many of these ports as were necessary, a couple of Frigates and a few Transports, so as to have in all fifteen thousand men on board, to make sure of landing ten thousand, and she hoped, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of our Fleets, that they might sail about the same time, and rendezvous in a certain latitude, whence they

they might sail to their several destinations, along the southern coast of *Ireland*, where there is scarce a port, in which they might not land, and with their abettors proceed unopposed until the several parties united; they well knew that the very small Military Establishment of *Ireland* was so dispersed on necessary duty over the kingdom, that, that part of it which could be spared to oppose them, could not arrive time enough to prevent their junction, and as to being annoyed by Men of War, they well knew that there never has been more than two or three stationed on that coast; the first step the enemy intended to take after their junction, and after having engaged by large bounties as many disaffected as would take arms, of which they were to bring over ten thousand stands, would be to possess themselves of *Corke*, *King'sale* and *Waterford*, and other considerable Towns, after which they would certainly attempt the Metropolis whereby contribution or pillage, they would possess themselves of whatever they could desire; the mischief they would perpetrate would be violent and sudden, and preparations to oppose them would be of course too late, raising an army and troops, and sending reinforcements from *England*, supposing *England* had nothing to fear for herself, would at least be a work of time, and in this case would be impeded by the very confusion and distress that made it immediately necessary; the present therefore is the only time, in which any measure can be taken to prevent these dreadful evils, with the least probability of success; proper preparations for defence made now, may prevent the attempt of our enemy, by precluding their hopes, and if the attempt is made, render it wholly ineffectual: As to fortifying the country it has two objects: To prevent an enemy's landing, and if an enemy should land,

land, to prevent his junction and progress; and the country may be sufficiently fortified to effect both these purposes, at a very moderate expence. It is not possible, nor indeed is it necessary, to guard, much less to fortify, all the ports and landing places on the southern coasts of *Ireland*: To fortify three or four such ports, dividing the coast as equally as possible, will be sufficient: One of these should be at or near *Corke*, the first town for trade, and the second for wealth in the kingdom; and these ports should be fortified in such a manner as to secure and defend our Men of War and Transports, both from within and without, so that troops, provisions, and military stores, may in these ports be safely landed, and whatever Men of War may be stationed there, may lie in security, and be ready to slip out and annoy the enemy, however widely they may be dispersed; to intercept reinforcements of every kind, when they shall have made their landing good; and effectually to cut them off when they shall be obliged to quit the country and reembark. As these fortifications will render the enemy's landing, even at distant places, difficult and precarious, they will also, if properly garrisoned, deter them from marching into the country, if they should get safely on shore; for no troops can be supposed so rash and imprudent, as to leave such a military force behind them, as may intercept their communication, and cut off their retreat, or at least harass them, comparatively without danger to themselves, having a fortress ready to receive them in case of a disadvantage: As to the northern coast, it is so circumstanced as to make all fortifications unnecessary; it is in the first place, at a very great distance from every port of *France*, and the navigation to it for Frigates and Transports is long, difficult and dangerous, and it has been already shewn



shewn that the animated spirit of the Protestant inhabitants of that part of *Ireland*, would very much intimidate an attempt, and if it happened, in all probability, effectually oppose it.

THE southern coasts therefore being fortified, and the northern needing no fortification, nothing would remain necessary for general defence, but a central fortress. A fortress nearly in the middle of the kingdom, and of the victualling countries, as far as they can possibly coincide, will be indispensably necessary for several purposes. In the first place for a magazine of provisions; the uncertainty of the climate makes such a magazine necessary, and the uncommon poverty of the people, if there were no other reasons, makes it necessary that it should be fortified, for they have never more than a supply of Potatoes and Salt from hand to mouth, and in some seasons not being able to procure a sufficient quantity even of these, it would be tempting them too far to place a hoard of provisions in their reach.

It is also requisite as a Repository for Arms and Military Stores, and in this view the great number of Roman Catholics that would surround it, make it necessary that it should be fortified: Such central Fortresses will also be of the utmost importance as a common rendezvous for all the troops, whence they may be dispatched to their several destinations, and supplied with provisions, ammunition, and arms, the provisions should undoubtedly be biscuit, for without this, a considerable army must either starve itself, or the inhabitants of the country that it occupies; in *Ireland* the first is the most probable event, for the inhabitants have almost at all times recourse to their potatoe ground for their subsistence from day to day.

Lastly,

Lastly, a Fortification like this would infallibly stop an enemy in his approach to the Capital, for it would be absolutely necessary for him to besiege and take it in his way ; to leave so strong a place behind him, would be the last excess of presumption and folly, as it would send out troops to harass his rear, put him between two fires and cut off his retreat ; it would at the same time intimidate the Roman Catholics and encourage the Protestants.

As the enemy could not approach the Capital until this Fortress should be taken, it will appear probable, upon further consideration, that they will never be able to approach it at all : the siege of such a place would be a work of more time and difficulty, than troops in such a situation as sudden invaders, for a temporary purpose, could spare or surmount, the tedious labour of debarking Cannon, and dragging them far into a hostile country, is well known, a labour in which the assailants would be liable to interruption, and would in this case, most certainly be annoyed and harassed by every effort that could be made for that purpose, in the mean time preparation would be making against them. The central Garrison and those on the Coast, might act in conjunction, and at the same time the Fortrefs in the centre keep a communication open between the southern and northern counties : from these measures the King's troops, and all his well affected subjects would derive the greatest encouragement and support : the very nature and circumstances of the country would intimidate and depress his enemies, and their abettors. As the enemy would find no stores of provision or forage in the whole country, there would be no subsistence even for a small Army, but by plunder and rapine, so that they would be under

under the fatal necessity of becoming a scourge even to their friends, and the best affected to their cause, would soon grow weary of such guests, under the misery of violence and famine; on the contrary our friends, being furnished from Magazines, would never become burthensome to the people, who, whatever their speculative opinions, would probably join with them, to drive away those who would otherwise starve them in their own country; but if such Magazines for the supply of our own troops are wanting, they must become oppressive and odious, and besides the inconvenience and distress which they must suffer themselves, will become objects of implacable resentment even to their friends, who, in mere self-defence, will join the enemy against them: In a word, without strong places no Military operation can be carried on with the least hope of success, in such a country as *Ireland*; in *Ireland* they are absolutely necessary as well for defence against a foreign enemy, as for its internal police, to protect Military Stores and Magazines, to assemble Troops, to encourage the well-affected, and over-awe the rebellious. Let it once more be observed, that as this important work will require time, it should be begun *immediately*, and a certain sum allotted yearly for that purpose until it is completed, the proper application of twenty thousand pounds, the sum which has been granted for the Militia, would make a considerable progress towards fortifying the country, and a Vote of Credit for an hundred thousand pounds this Session, would put the kingdom in a very respectable situation.

I HAVE now endeavoured to reconcile those to the Augmentation Bill, who dispassionately considered it as an unnecessary or injurious measure, if any such

D

there



there are, and I have also endeavoured to represent the inefficacy and disadvantage of a Militia, a scheme which to me seems to have nothing plausible to recommend it; and if I have been so happy as to succeed in my undertaking, it will appear that our Chief Governor who supported one measure, and disapproved of the other, is worthy of our confidence in his public character; and I appeal to those who are acquainted with him, whether he is not in his private character deserving of their affection and esteem.

WHEN I treated of the instability of the Peace, I made no mention of *Spain*, because I am persuaded that, with respect to Peace and War, she must be governed wholly by *France*. 'Till *France* is able and willing to join her, she, must at all events agree with *Great-Britain*, and therefore I think it very probable that *Bucorelli* acted without orders from his court in seizing *Falkland* Island; for what could induce *Spain* to imbroil herself with *England*, before she knew whether *France* would support her in a War? What could induce her to seize an Island which was of so little value, which she knew she could not keep without assistance, nor give up without the most humiliating concession.

THUS, Gentlemen, have I availed myself of my birth-right, as a subject of almost the only free State in the world: That I can, though a private individual, safely express my sentiments, without reserve, upon subjects of the most general concern, and the highest importance, is a privilege of which I am sure you will not wish to deprive me, and if I am mistaken in my opinion, I am mistaken in common with many others, to whose judgment and penetration the world has on many occasions

occasions shewn a deference and regard to which I have no claim. I am however little concerned to ward off any censure upon my judgment, as my sincerity will at all events secure me the approbation of my Conscience, my sole view has been to contribute my Mite to the service of this poor forsaken Country, in it's present dangerous situation ; and I know not how I can give a stronger proof, that I am with very great respect to you, as an aggregate body, and affection to many of you as individuals.

Your faithful fellow Subject,  
and Well-wisher.

A FREE-HOLDER.

F I N I S.



DM 17 1771

B I N I E



